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2Abstract
Analysing metacognition, specifically knowledge of accuracy of internal perceptual,
memorial or other knowledge states, is vital for many strands of psychology, including
determining the accuracy of feelings of knowing, and discriminating conscious from
unconscious cognition. Quantifying metacognitive sensitivity is however more challenging
than quantifying basic stimulus sensitivity. Under popular signal detection theory (SDT)
models for stimulus classification tasks, approaches based on type II receiver-operator
characteristic (ROC) curves or type II d-prime risk confounding metacognition with
response biases in either the type I (classification) or type II (metacognitive) tasks. A new
approach introduces meta-d′: the type I d-prime that would have led to the observed type
II data had the subject used all the type I information. Here we (i) further establish the
inconsistency of the type II d-prime and ROC approaches with new explicit analyses of
the standard SDT model, and (ii) analyse, for the first time, the behaviour of meta-d′
under non-trivial scenarios, such as when metacognitive judgments utilize enhanced or
degraded versions of the type I evidence. Analytically, meta-d′ values typically reflect the
underlying model well, and are stable under changes in decision criteria; however, in
relatively extreme cases meta-d′ can become unstable. We explore bias and variance of
in-sample measurements of meta-d′ and supply MATLAB code for estimation in general
cases. Our results support meta-d′ as a useful measure of metacognition, and provide
rigorous methodology for its application. Our recommendations are useful for any
researchers interested in assessing metacognitive accuracy.
Keywords: metacognition; signal-detection theory; modeling; meta-d′; confidence;
discrimination
3Metacognition, and in particular the ability to assess the accuracy of knowledge
states, is fundamental to understanding executive processes (e.g. Koriat, 2007), the nature
of memory (e.g. Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010), good educational practice (e.g.
Koriat, 2012), gambling (e.g. Lueddeke & Higham, 2011), development (e.g. Beck,
McColgan, Robinson & Rowley, 2011), cognitive differences between species (e.g. Smith,
Beran, Couchman, Coutinho & Boomer, 2009), social interaction (e.g. Frith, 2012),
mental illness (e.g. Hamm et al 2012), and the distinction between conscious and
unconscious processes in perception (e.g. Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010) and learning (e.g.
Dienes & Seth, 2010). Given the range of applications, it would be helpful to have
standard guidelines on measures of metacognitive accuracy. Nelson (1984) argued for
Goodman-Kruskal’s gamma coefficient, G, as an all purpose measure of association in
metacognition research. His arguments persuaded many researchers; Masson & Rotello
(2009) reported that in 2000-2008, of 64 articles on metacognition in the journal titles
they chose, half had followed Nelson’s advice. Nonetheless, Masson and Rotello argued
that G is sensitive to bias (i.e. a priori disposition to respond in one way or another), and
thus not ideal. They recommended a signal detection approach instead. Here we will
pursue the use of signal detection theory (SDT) to determine the suitability of the
different signal detection measures of association available for assessing metacognition.
SDT has been a major innovation in psychology and neuroscience, proving
extremely useful for measuring stimulus discrimination accuracy independently of
response bias (Lau & Passingham, 2006; Lau, 2008; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). In a
typical stimulus discrimination study subjects encounter many trials, in each of which
they make a forced-choice response, classifying a stimulus as either present versus absent,
or as ‘type A’ versus ‘type B’. SDT posits that the discrimination decision on this
so-called ‘type I’ task is based on internally generated evidence that follows distinct
Gaussian probability distributions in the respective scenarios of ‘absent’ and ‘present’ (see
4Figure 1 and e.g. Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). The fundamental SDT measure of
discrimination performance, ‘type I d-prime’, is defined theoretically as the difference
between the means divided by the standard deviation of the ‘absent’ distribution.1 SDT
further assumes a decision threshold (or criterion) determining whether the subject
responds ‘absent’ or ‘present’, allowing each trial to be classified as a hit, miss, false
alarm, or correct rejection. On this model, type I d-prime is by definition independent of
this decision threshold and is therefore insensitive to response bias.
Given the success of SDT in measuring type I stimulus discrimination, there has
been a natural motivation to apply it also to the so-called type II, or metacognitive, task
(Clarke, Birdsall, & W. P. Tanner, 1959; Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003;
Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010; Ko &
Lau, 2012) in which the subject classifies their (type I) stimulus classification responses as
either ‘confident’ or ‘unconfident’ (or as occupying a point on a continuous or discrete
confidence scale), reflecting the extent to which s/he can discriminate between their
correct and incorrect responses. On the standard SDT model, this confidence judgment
(type II response) is made based on two confidence thresholds applied to the same
evidence as for the type I response (see Figure 1, and Macmillan & Creelman, 2005;
Kunimoto, Miller & Pashler, 2001). Within this general framework, several methods for
measuring metacognition on such tasks have been proposed, however obtaining a measure
that is stable and insensitive to (types I and II) response bias has proven challenging
(Galvin et al., 2003, Masson & Rotello, 2009). In this paper we explore and evaluate three
distinct SDT-inspired approaches to measuring metacognitive sensitivity, and present
evidence favouring one in particular - the relatively new meta-d′ measure (Maniscalco &
Lau, 2012).
We first consider ‘type II d-prime’, which is computed from type II hit and false
alarm rates using the directly analogous formula to type I d-prime (a type II hit [false
5alarm] is a correct [incorrect] type I response made with high confidence; Kunimoto et al.,
2001). While superficially appealing, this approach has been criticised because the
standard SDT model explicitly implies non-Gaussian distributions for correct and
incorrect type I responses, violating the assumptions underlying the d-prime measure
(Galvin et al., 2003; Evans & Azzopardi, 2007; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Nevertheless, a
thorough theoretical analysis of the behaviour of this measure on this model has not been
previously performed. Leveraging new formulae for type II quantities, we address this
need by systematically exploring the sensitivity of type II d-prime to (types I and II)
response bias by varying decision and confidence thresholds across their entire ranges.
An alternative to type II d-prime that has received some support (Kolb & Braun,
1995; Wilimzig, Tsuchiya, Fahle, Einhuser, & Koch, 2008; Clifford, Arabzadeh & Harris,
2008; Masson & Rotello, 2009) is the use of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
to assess type II behaviour. A type I ROC curve characterizes stimulus discriminability by
plotting the hit rate against false alarm rate for all possible decision thresholds (see Figure
4 for examples). While type I ROC curves are easy to obtain and interpret, the type II
case is less clear. Specifically, when plotting type II hit rate against type II false alarm
rate, multiple type II ROC curves can be constructed because these curves depend on
three parameters: the single type I threshold and the two type II thresholds. Galvin et
al. (2003) and Clifford et al. (2008) have each proposed distinct approaches to
constructing ROC curves for analysing metacognition. However both approaches yield
results that depend on type I response bias. Here we undertake new systematic analyses
involving derivations of ROC curves that show, for a given decision threshold, the
maximum attainable type II hit rate as a function of type II false alarm rate.
The approach we consider in the most detail is the meta-d′ approach, recently
introduced by Maniscalco and Lau (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Rounis et al., 2010). The
conceptual basis of meta-d′ is to compute the type I d-prime that would have led to the
6observed type II data, had the observer been using the standard SDT model. Departure
from optimal metacognition on the standard SDT model can then be measured by
comparing meta-d′ with type I d-prime. By construction meta-d′ and type I d-prime are
equal, irrespective of (types I and II) response bias, on the standard SDT model.
However, its behaviour under more general and empirically plausible scenarios has not
been previously explored. Addressing this need, we systematically analyse scenarios in
which metacognitive judgments utilize enhanced or degraded versions of the type I
evidence, and when the decision threshold is jittered (Kellen, Klauer, & Singmann, 2012).
Further we perform simulations to characterize how the meta-d′ measures behave with
finite data samples.
Type I signal detection theory
FIGURE 1 HERE
In this section we introduce formally the standard feed-forward Gaussian SDT
model of perception. This model is schematized in Figure 1, and a full list of
mathematical notation and terminology is summarized in Table 1. On this model, the
task is to correctly classify a binary stimulus S ∈ {0, 1}, with the value 0 corresponding to
stimulus absent and the value 1 corresponding to stimulus present. (The case of instead
distinguishing between two different stimuli is treated in Appendix A; all results are very
similar.) Throughout we assume an equal likelihood of stimulus present or stimulus
absent, so P (S = 1) = 0.5. Perception is based on the evidence X, which is a Gaussian
random variable, with mean and standard deviation dependent on S. When the stimulus
is absent X takes a standard Gaussian distribution of mean 0 and standard deviation 1,
i.e. N (0, 1). We denote the cumulative distribution function of this probability
distribution by Φ0, and the probability density function by φ0. Given the stimulus is
present, the distribution for X is a Gaussian of mean d′ and standard deviation σ. We
7denote the cumulative distribution function of this probability distribution by Φd′,σ, and
the probability density function by φd′,σ (see Figure 2). These conventions are consistent
with a definition of d′ as the distance between means in units of the noise distribution
standard deviation.2 The response R is also binary, with R = 0 corresponding to
responding ‘stimulus absent’ and R = 1 corresponding to responding ‘stimulus present’.
The response is decided based upon the decision threshold, θ (also referred to as ‘type I
threshold’). If X < θ then R = 0, and if X ≥ θ then R = 1.
TABLE 1 HERE
To measure d′ from empirical data, we compute the hit rate h =: P (R = 1|S = 1)
(i.e. the probability that the response is ‘present’ given that the stimulus is present) and
the false alarm rate f =: P (R = 1|S = 0) (i.e. the probability that the response is
‘present’ given that the stimulus is absent), and utilize the formula
d′ = σΦ−10 (h)− Φ
−1
0 (f) , (1)
which follows from the easy-to-derive formulae:
h = 1− Φd′,σ(θ) , (2)
f = 1− Φ0(θ) . (3)
One can also obtain the decision threshold θ in terms of the false alarm rate:
θ = −Φ−10 (f) . (4)
Note that the standard deviation σ of the ‘stimulus present’ distribution is an extra
parameter that cannot be determined by a single measurement of the hit and false alarm
rates. In practice σ = 1 is often assumed.3 Alternatively, one can ask subjects to include a
confidence rating with their response,4 and then obtain by proxy multiple measurements
of the hit and false alarm rates associated with alternative decision thresholds in which,
for example, R = 1 is assigned only to trials on which the subject replies ‘stimulus present’
8and gives a confidence rating above a certain value. Each corresponding hit and false
alarm rate can then be substituted into (1), allowing the d′ and σ that provide the best
overall fit to be found. Throughout this paper, however, we assume σ is a fixed, given
parameter, and hence that a single measurement of the hit and false alarm rates will
determine d′ and the decision threshold θ.
It is useful to note that, while d′ is analytically invariant with respect to the
decision threshold, in practice measurements of d′ become numerically unstable for
extreme decision thresholds. This is because if either the hit rate or the false alarm rate is
close to either 0 or 1, a small inaccuracy in measurement leads to a drastic error in the
corresponding Φ−10 value in the formula (1) (Figure 2).
FIGURE 2 HERE
Type II signal detection theory
The standard model of type II SDT is applicable to the type II task of correctly
distinguishing correct from incorrect responses made under the type I SDT framework.
Here, we provide expressions for type II hit and false alarm rates for use in subsequent
sections. For a summary of mathematical notation and terminology see Table 1.
On the standard SDT model, the confidence judgment (type II response) is based on
the same evidence as the type I response (Figure 1). We denote correctness of the type I
response by T (for truth), and the confidence in the response by C. As for the stimulus
and response, these variables are assumed to take binary values belonging to {0, 1}, with 1
corresponding respectively to the response being correct and the subject being confident
in their response. Confidence thresholds (also referred to as type II thresholds) τ− and τ+
are introduced. If the evidence X is less than τ− or greater than τ+ then the subject is
confident, C = 1. We constrain the types I and II thresholds to be in a sensible order, so
τ− < θ < τ+. The type II hit rate H and false alarm rate F are defined respectively as
9H =: P (C = 1|T = 1), F =: P (C = 1|T = 0), i.e. rates for being confident when correct
and for being confident when incorrect. Given these conventions the following formulae for
H and F can be derived (see Appendix B for details):
H =
1 + Φ0(τ−)− Φd′,σ(τ+)
1 + Φ0(θ)− Φd′,σ(θ)
, (5)
F =
1− Φ0(τ+) + Φd′,σ(τ−)
1− Φ0(θ) + Φd′,σ(θ)
. (6)
Response conditional type II hit rates H+ and H− are defined as the type II hit rates
restricted respectively to positive and negative (type I) responses,
i.e. H+ =: P (C = 1|T = 1, R = 1), H− =: P (C = 1|T = 1, R = 0). Similarly, response
conditional type II false alarm rates F+ and F− are defined by
F+ =: P (C = 1|T = 0, R = 1), F− =: P (C = 1|T = 0, R = 0). The formulae for these
quantities are:
H+ = P (X > τ+|X > θ, S = 1) =
1− Φd′,σ(τ+)
1− Φd′,σ(θ)
, (7)
F+ = P (X > τ+|X > θ, S = 0) =
1−Φ0(τ+)
1− Φ0(θ)
, (8)
H− =
Φ0(τ−)
Φ0(θ)
, (9)
F− =
Φd′,σ(τ−)
Φd′,σ(θ)
. (10)
In what follows, we will describe, analyse and evaluate three possible ways of
measuring performance at the type II task: these are respectively type II d-prime, type II
ROC curve analysis, and meta-d′. A good measure should not depend on decision or
confidence thresholds, but only on the amount of information available for making the
confidence judgment. Thus, when assuming that the type I and II responses are based on
the same standard SDT model, a good measure should be fully determined by d′. In other
scenarios (see for example the section ‘Meta-d′ on alternative SDT models’), a good
measure should generally increase with the amount of information available for making
the confidence judgment.
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Type II d-prime
FIGURE 3 HERE
Type II d-prime, which we denote by D′, is computed by simply substituting the
type II hit and false alarm rates into the formula (1) for type I d-prime. As mentioned in
the introduction, type II d-prime is not a principled measure of type II performance, since
under standard SDT assumptions the type II decision axis cannot be mapped onto a
variable for which the evidence is given by a pair of Gaussian distributions (i.e., of the
form shown in Figure 1 with a transformed version of the type I evidence on the
horizontal axis, see Galvin et al., 2003). Further, Evans & Azzopardi (2007) found type II
d-prime to vary strongly with (types I and II) response bias in various empirical scenarios.
Nevertheless, a systematic investigation into the theoretical behaviour of this measure on
the standard SDT model, under varying decision and confidence thresholds, has not
previously been performed. We provide this here.
From (5) and (6) type II d-prime on the standard SDT model is given in terms of
decision and confidence thresholds by
D′ ≡ σΦ−10 (H)−Φ
−1
0 (F ) = σΦ
−1
0
(
1 + Φ0(τ−)− Φd′,σ(τ+)
1 + Φ0(θ)− Φd′,σ(θ)
)
−Φ−10
(
1− Φ0(τ+) + Φd′,σ(τ−)
1− Φ0(θ) + Φd′,σ(θ)
)
.
(11)
Using this formula, D′ can be computed for any values of d′, σ, θ, τ+ and τ−. We
investigated D′ across the full space of possible type I and II thresholds for the case
d′ = 1, σ = 1. Figure 3 shows the behaviour of D′ in an informative subset of these cases.
To better understand how variations in D′ arise in these scenarios, Figure 3 also shows the
corresponding type II ROC curves (i.e., the relation between type II hit and false alarm
rate under each of the variations of thresholds; bottom row). To enable later comparison
of measures we also show meta-d′, which is defined in the section ‘Meta-d′’.
Figure 3(d) shows that when θ = 0.5 (i.e. at the point of intersection of the two
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evidence distributions) the highest D′ is obtained by placing the type II thresholds τ+ and
τ− as far away as possible from the type I threshold θ. That is, D
′ is maximized by being
maximally unconfident. Figure 3(e) shows that it is possible to have D′ negative when all
of the type I and II thresholds are set high; while this scenario clearly does not reflect a
sensible choice of decision and confidence criteria it is nevertheless not a priori obvious
that D′ could be negative. Again challenging intuition, Figure 3(f) shows that is possible
to have D′ greater than d′. Previously, this outcome had been shown to be impossible
given the assumption that F = f (Galvin et al., 2003); our results show that this result
does not generalize to the more general case of F 6= f .5
Some of the more extreme D′ values obtained in the above analyses arise from
decision and confidence threshold values that lead to extreme (i.e., close to 0 or 1) hit
rates or false alarm rates. However, D′ remains very sensitive to decision and confidence
threshold values even for empirically reasonable ranges for which
0.05 < h, f,H, F,H+, F+,H−, F− < 0.95. For example, within these ranges one can obtain
D′ = 0.40 by taking τ− = 0.4, θ = 0.5, τ+ = 0.6, and a very different D
′ = 0.95 by taking
τ− = −0.5, θ = 1.6, τ+ = 1.65. Reflecting these variations in D
′, the positions of the
corresponding ROC curves (in relation to the type I ROC curve) are also highly variable
[Figure 3(g)-(i)]. Type II ROC curves are examined in more detail in the section ‘Optimal
type II ROC curves and Hmax’.
Summarizing results in this section, we have confirmed the hypothesis that D′ is a
poor measure of metacognitive sensitivity, validating previous empirical findings (Evans &
Azzopardi, 2007). For the standard SDT model, D′ is highly dependent on choice of
decision and confidence thresholds, takes high values when confidence thresholds are such
that confidence is almost always low [Figure 3(a,d)], and is not bounded from either above
or below by the benchmark values of 0 [Figure 3(b,e)] or type I d-prime [Figure 3(c,f)].
12
Optimal type II ROC curves and Hmax
We next investigate the use of ROC curves to measure type II performance on the
standard SDT model. ROC curves have been proposed as being useful for evaluating type
II sensitivity in a more stable manner than D′, since they characterize type II behaviour
over a range of confidence thresholds (Galvin et al., 2003; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).
However, in contrast to type I SDT, for which there is a single decision threshold, and
hence a single ROC curve, for type II SDT there are in addition two confidence thresholds
that can be varied, implying corresponding families of ROC curves.
In their important paper, Galvin et al. (2003) obtained a single type II ROC curve
for each possible type I threshold by employing a slightly different model in which a single
confidence threshold based on the likelihood ratio of being correct versus incorrect on the
type I task. Using this approach they found that type II ROC curves depend strongly on
the type I threshold, with considerable variation in the area underneath the type II ROC
curve. This result implies that type II performance measured via ROC curves is also
strongly dependent on type I response bias, even under ‘perfect’ metacognition that is
utilising all of the available type I information (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Clifford et
al. (2008) proposed assessing metacognitive sensitivity by comparing the standard type I
ROC curve with alternative type I ROC curves derived from confidence ratings. The
latter are derived from various regroupings of the data, for example, by classifying
responses as ‘present’ only when the subject responds ‘present’ with high confidence.
Under perfect metacognition, all ROC curves coincide; in other cases they diverge. Again
though, the degree of divergence is not in general independent of type I response bias.
In this section we report new analyses exploring the optimal type II ROC curves
attainable for each type I threshold. That is, for a fixed type I threshold θ, the ROC curve
we consider is that which plots F against the maximum possible H given F and θ. In
order to study these optimal type II ROC curves, we must define the quantity
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Hmax ≡ Hmax(f, h, F ) as the maximal H for a given F , f and h on the standard SDT
model. An algorithm for computing Hmax is described in Appendix C (and Appendix D
describes the dependence of Hmax on type I response bias). For a given d
′, σ and θ, fixed
values of h and f are computed using (2) and (3). The optimal type II ROC curve is then
obtained by computing Hmax for these fixed values of f and h across varying values of F .
FIGURE 4 HERE
Following this approach, Figure 4 shows the dependence of the optimal type II ROC
curve on the type I threshold, for the case d′ = 1, σ = 1. Figure 4(c) presents the optimal
type II ROC curve when the type I threshold is placed at the intersection point of the two
evidence distributions (θ = 0.5). There it lies below the type I ROC curve. Figure 4(d)
meanwhile plots this for a very conservative type I detection criterion (θ = 3). There the
type I and optimal type II ROC curves are approximately equal, but with the optimal
type II ROC curve lying partly above the corresponding type I ROC curve [see D′ in
panel (f)]. In the bottom panels in Figure 4, D′ values corresponding to Hmax are plotted
against F , and as expected show considerable variability, even though in all cases
performance is optimal. To enable comparison we also plot meta-d′, which is defined in
the section ‘Meta-d′’.
The above results cast doubt on the utility of ROC curves for characterizing
metacognitive sensitivity by showing that, even under the standard SDT model, these
curves exhibit strong dependence on type I response bias. Although only extreme choices
of decision and confidence thresholds lead to type II ROC curve points lying above the
type I ROC curve, we may also conclude that it is difficult to assess by straightforward
inspection of type I and type II ROC curve profiles whether SDT is a good fit for a
dataset, since the expected discrepancy between curves is different in different cases.
Having said this, our novel method of computing optimal type II ROC curves via Hmax
does provide an algorithmic test for whether a particular dataset is adequately modelled
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by SDT. Specifically, one can compare the observed H with the value of Hmax computed
from the observed values of F , h and f : If H > Hmax then the data are not plausibly fit
by SDT.
Meta-d′
So far, we have explored the properties of type II d-prime and optimal type II ROC
curves on the standard SDT model, concluding that the former is highly dependent on
both type I and II response bias, and that the latter is dependent on type I response bias.
A true measure of metacognitive sensitivity should not depend on response biases, i.e. be
independent of both decision and confidence thresholds on the SDT model, assuming that
type I and II responses are based on the same underlying evidence (Maniscalco & Lau,
2012). Addressing this need, Lau et al. (Rounis et al., 2010; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012)
have recently introduced meta-d′, a measure which is explicitly designed to be constant
and equal to d′ whenever the standard SDT model underlies both type I and II responses.
Meta-d′ is defined as the type I d-prime that would have led to the observed type II data,
assuming the subject’s response and confidence judgment both follow the standard SDT
model. Thus, departure from ideal metacognition will correspond to a difference between
meta-d′ and d′, the magnitude of which has a clear interpretation in units that correspond
to the stimulus absent evidence standard deviation. (Type II d-prime is formulated in
different units from type I d-prime, making it hard to directly compare, notwithstanding
the issue of response bias sensitivity.) Specifically, imperfect metacognition will be
indicated by meta-d′ < d′; alternatively, enhanced metacognition (e.g., potentially
reflecting accumulation of information between type I and type II responses) would be
indicated by meta-d′ > d′.
There are several possible operational definitions of meta-d′. In this paper we
examine the performance of two versions: Lau et al’s meta-d′-SSE (d˜′
SSE
; sum-square
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error), and the novel meta-d′-balance (d˜′
b
). (Here and in all discussion of meta-d′, tildes
denote all the ‘meta’ quantities that enter equations, i.e. model parameters and type I
data that would have led to the observed type II data if the observer were a standard SDT
observer.) Both measures rely on two pairs of equations, one pair obtained by considering
type II performance following a positive type I response, and the other pair obtained by
considering type II performance following a negative type I response. These equations can
not in general be solved simultaneously. The data-driven d˜′
SSE
measure is obtained by
finding the closest fit, i.e. the value which minimizes the sum of the squares of the errors
of all the equations. Our theory-driven d˜′
b
measure operates from a slightly different
approach, being defined as the weighted average of the solutions for the two pairs of
equations, weighted according to the proportion of positive and negative type I responses.
We now formally define the two measures. The construction of both d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
depend on the quantities d˜′+ and d˜
′
−, each of which in turn depend on the ‘relative type I
threshold’, Θ. Let us define all these entities. The ‘relative type I threshold’ Θ is the ratio
between θ and d′. Then, d˜′+ is the type I d-prime that would have led to the observed type
II data H+ and F+ under the Θ implied by the type I data h and f ; analogously, d˜
′
− is the
type I d-prime that would have led to the observed type II data H− and F− under the Θ
implied by h and f . Lau et al. (Rounis et al., 2010; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012) derive d˜′
SSE
by assuming d˜′+ = d˜
′
− and obtaining the common value that minimizes the sum of the
squares of the errors in the combined system of equations for d˜′+ and d˜
′
− (see below). By
contrast, d˜′
b
allows d˜′+ and d˜
′
− to differ, enabling the derivation of an implicit form
analytical expression for meta-d′. d˜′
b
is then defined as the weighted mean of d˜′+ and d˜
′
−,
weighted according to the respective proportion of positive and negative type I responses.
Both versions of meta-d′ are formulated in terms of response-conditional type II hit
and false alarm rates (H+, F+, H− and F−) rather than response-unconditional hit and
false alarm rates (H and F ) because there is no unique type I d′ that yields a given H and
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F under a given relative type I threshold. This is the same reason, in terms of degrees of
freedom, why h, f and F do not uniquely determine H [see the section ‘Optimal type II
ROC curves and Hmax’, and also (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012)]. Note that we do not report
on the properties of d˜′+ and d˜
′
− themselves because we found them to be unstable
compared to d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
.
To derive an expression for d˜′
b
we first need an expression for the relative type I
threshold Θ:
Θ =:
θ
d′
=
−Φ−10 (f)
σΦ−10 (h) −Φ
−1
0 (f)
, (12)
which follows from (4) and (1). Then, for d˜′+, the meta type I threshold satisfies
θ˜+ = Θd˜
′
+ , (13)
where the subscript ‘+’ indicates ‘meta’ quantities related to d˜′+. Substituting this
expression into (7) and (8) yields H+ and F+ in terms of meta quantities, furnishing the
implicit equations
H+ =
1− Φ
d˜′
+
,σ
(τ˜++)
1− Φ
d˜′
+
,σ
(Θd˜′+)
, (14)
F+ =
1− Φ0(τ˜++)
1−Φ0(Θd˜′+)
, (15)
which uniquely specify d˜′+, as well as τ˜++, given H+, F+, h, f and σ, and Θ via (12). One
can also obtain the meta type I data from the analogues of (2) and (3), i.e. the type I hit
rate and false alarm rate that would have led to the observed type II data on the ideal
SDT model, using the observed relative type I threshold:
h˜+ = 1− Φd˜′
+
,σ
(θ˜+) , (16)
f˜+ = 1− Φ0(θ˜+) . (17)
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Similarly, the equations for d˜′− are
θ˜− = Θd˜
′
− , (18)
H− =
Φ0(τ˜−−)
Φ0(Θd˜
′
−)
, (19)
F− =
Φ
d˜′
−
,σ
(τ˜−−)
Φ
d˜′
−
,σ
(Θd˜′−)
, (20)
and the meta type I quantities h˜− and f˜− are given by
h˜− = 1− Φd˜′
−
,σ
(θ˜−) , (21)
f˜− = 1− Φ0(θ˜−) . (22)
Having obtained d˜′+ and d˜
′
−, d˜
′
b
is computed as the weighted average:
d˜′b = rd˜
′
+ + (1− r)d˜
′
− , (23)
where r is the probability of a positive type I response, given by
r =
1
2
(h+ f) . (24)
As mentioned, Lau et al’s d˜′
SSE
measure takes a slightly different approach. To
compute d˜′SSE one adds error terms to the equations (14), (15), (19) and (20) for d˜
′
+ and
d˜′−, and substitutes a common value, d˜
′, for both d˜′+ and d˜
′
−:
H+ =
1− Φ
d˜′,σ
(τ˜++)
1− Φ
d˜′,σ
(Θd˜′)
+ ǫ1 , (25)
F+ =
1− Φ0(τ˜++)
1− Φ0(Θd˜′)
+ ǫ2 , (26)
H− =
Φ0(τ˜−−)
Φ0(Θd˜′)
+ ǫ3 , (27)
F− =
Φ
d˜′,σ
(τ˜−−)
Φ
d˜′,σ
(Θd˜′)
+ ǫ4 . (28)
d˜′
SSE
is then the value of d˜′ that minimizes the sum of the squares of the errors ǫ1, . . . , ǫ4.
18
Basic properties of meta-d′ support its use as a measure of metacognitive sensitivity.
First, such a measure should clearly indicate ‘perfect’ metacognition, i.e., when all the
available type I information is utilized in making a type II response. Reflecting this by
design, meta-d′ is always equal to d′ when type I and II responses are made using the
standard SDT model. This property is shown explicitly in Figures 3 and 4 under multiple
scenarios of decision and confidence threshold variation; see also (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012).
Second, a useful measure should smoothly increase with type II hit rate and
smoothly decrease with type II false alarm rate when other variables remain constant.
This is indeed typically how both meta-d′ measures behave: Figure 5(a) shows an example
of meta-d′ decreasing with F±, and Figure 5(b) shows an example of meta-d
′ increasing
with H±. The smooth dependence of meta-d
′ on H± and F± does however break down
when either H+, H−, F+, F− or any of the meta type I hit or false alarm rates h˜+, f˜+,
h˜−, f˜− take very large or small values. In those cases, a small change in the data leads to
large changes in the meta-d′ measures. This instability occurs due to the nature of the
Gaussian cumulative density function Φ0 close to 0 or 1, and occurs also in standard (type
I) SDT (Figure 2). Measurements of meta-d′ will therefore sometimes be unstable, so it is
useful to define exclusion criteria that lead to a restricted domain of application. Since
meta-d′ depends on both type I and type II quantities, a principled criterion would be to
restrict application of meta-d′ to cases for which
0.05 < h˜+, f˜+, h˜−, f˜−,H+, F+,H−, F− < 0.95 . (29)
Note that it is necessary to include the meta type I quantities in this criterion, and that a
more simple exclusion band based solely on the type II hit and false alarm rates would not
be sufficient to ensure stability of the meta-d′ measures. An example of meta-d′ becoming
unstable due to extreme meta type I quantities is that, in the entire wide exclusion area
on the right-hand side of Figure 5(b), the meta type I false alarm rate f˜+ is less than 0.05,
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even though in most of this region the type II hit and false alarm rates take middling
values. More generally instability will arise at very high levels of type II response
accuracy, when H± is much greater than F±. The examples in Figure 5 show that when
(29) is satisfied, the meta-d′ measures vary slowly and smoothly as the data change, and
that d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
are in good agreement with each other.
FIGURE 5 HERE
Meta-d′ on alternative SDT models
Previously, the theoretical behaviour of meta-d′ has only been analysed on the
standard SDT model, which assumes type I and II responses are made based on the same
evidence, entailing ‘perfect metacognition’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). However, in
experimental data, departure from this behaviour has been observed, most notably with
meta-d′ less than d′, interpreted as signalling imperfect metacognition (Maniscalco & Lau,
2012; Rounis et al., 2010). To examine the extent to which meta-d′ measures do indeed
capture metacognitive efficacy in a meaningful way, independently of (type I or II)
response bias, we investigated the analytic behaviour of meta-d′ measures on several
distinct models that depart from the standard model.
FIGURE 6 HERE
We first considered a ‘degrading signal’ model, on which the type II response is
based on weaker evidence than the type I response. On this model the type I response
arises from evidence based on a standard SDT model, while the type II response is based
on a regression of this evidence towards the mean of the stimulus absent distribution
(i.e. 0), reflecting a possible time delay between the type I and II response (see
Supplemental Material for details). Thus, given the type I evidence, the mean type II
evidence is closer to zero than the type I evidence, and also has additional variance
reflecting stochasticity in trial-to-trial signal decay. Figure 6 illustrates an example of this
20
model and plots the behaviour of d˜′
b
and d˜′SSE. Both d˜
′
b
and d˜′SSE are approximately
independent of decision and confidence thresholds. There is some variation as the type I
threshold θ is varied, but this variation is very much smaller than common cases of type II
d-prime variation on the standard SDT model (compare Figures 3 and 4).
FIGURE 7 HERE
We next considered an ‘enhancing signal’ model, on which the type II response is
based on stronger evidence than the type I response. Again, the type I response arises
from evidence based on a standard SDT model, but here the type II response is based on
the assumption that the evidence accumulates over time (for ‘present’ stimuli; see
Supplemental Material for details). One scenario in which this model might apply is when
a subject has very limited time to make the type I response, but greater time to make the
type II response. Figure 7 illustrates an example and plots the behaviour of d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
.
Although both measures show some variation as decision and confidence thresholds are
varied, both measures produce the expected output of meta-d′ > d′ in all cases, reflecting
the enhanced type II evidence. Further, the two measures give very similar values, with
only slight divergence near the limits of allowed threshold ranges.
Further examples of the degrading and enhancing signal models, with unequal
variances (σ = 2), are presented respectively in Figures S1 and S2 in the Supplemental
Material. In those examples, the measures exhibit greater variability, and there are cases
for which the d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
are slightly divergent. However, importantly, in almost all
cases, meta-d′ < d′ on the degrading signal model and meta-d′ > d′ on the enhancing
signal model, reflecting respectively the degraded and enhanced type II evidence. The
Supplemental Material also presents analyses of a model with criterion jitter (Kellen et al.,
2012).
Our analyses of several alternative SDT models have confirmed that, across a broad
range of empirically plausible scenarios, the meta-d′ measures d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
behave well as
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measures of metacognitive sensitivity. We found meta-d′ measures to consistently give
values that reflect the level of metacognition incorporated by design into each model.
Moreover, the values obtained remained approximately invariant under changes to the
decision and confidence thresholds, confirming that the measures are indeed quantifying
metacognitive sensitivity independently of (type I or II) response bias and type I criterion
jitter.
Bias and variance of meta-d′ measures in sample
The results so far have considered the analytical behaviour of meta-d′ on simple,
idealized signal detection theoretic models. While very useful, such idealized models are
not able to illuminate some issues of empirical importance, notably the possibility of bias
and high variance when estimating meta-d′ in sample. In this section we confront the
behaviour of meta-d′ measures on finite data samples by examining bias and variance in
measurements of d′ and meta-d′ in simulation. We illustrate selected examples, that
demonstrate possible outcomes at three different levels of assumed metacognitive
performance. We then describe the MATLAB code provided with this paper, which can
be used to generate simulated data allowing estimations of expected bias and variance for
discrimination experiments in general.
To ensure generality our simulations do not assume a specific model of evidence or
decision axes, rather they take as input just the type I and type II hit and false alarm
rates h, f , H± and F±. Given these values, we simulate a finite number of trials (50 per
subject in the following examples), such that in-sample empirical hit and false alarm rates
can be obtained. These empirical rates are then used to compute d′ and meta-d′ measures.
We have already demonstrated the importance of using exclusion criteria to ensure
stability of SDT measures. These criteria become even more acute in finite samples. We
therefore consider two alternative criteria for excluding outlying subjects in the following
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simulations. The first is a ‘narrow’ set which allow outliers, but which requires that hit
and false alarm rates do not take their end values, i.e., we impose strict inequalities:
0 < hˆ, fˆ , Hˆ+, Fˆ+, Hˆ−, Fˆ− < 1, hˆ 6= fˆ , (30)
whereˆdenotes an empirical quantity. This is the minimal set of exclusion criteria for
which meta-d′ will be computable for all included subjects.
The second ‘wide’ set of exclusion criteria is based on (29), and excludes subjects
with extreme data that can lead to distorted measurements due to the properties of
z-values at limits (see Figure 2):
0.05 < hˆ, fˆ , ˆ˜h+,
ˆ˜f+,
ˆ˜h−,
ˆ˜f−Hˆ+, Fˆ+, Hˆ−, Fˆ− < 0.95, hˆ 6= fˆ . (31)
TABLE 2 HERE
We explored bias and variance of d′, d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
in sample for low, medium and
high metacognition examples. The chosen values for the type I and II hit and false alarm
rates in each example are given in Table 2. For each example, and respectively for wide
and narrow exclusion criteria, we simulated 50 trials per subject for 10,000 (non-excluded)
subjects. For each level of metacognition and for each set of exclusion criteria we
computed the probability of a subject being excluded, and the bias and standard
deviation of measurements of d′, d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
across subjects.
FIGURE 8 HERE
Figure 8 shows the results from these simulations. Both meta-d′ measures exhibited
bias when estimated from finite data samples; in these simulations d˜′
SSE
showed less bias
than d˜′
b
. The bias was positive for narrow exclusion criteria and negative for wide
exclusion criteria, with absolute values larger for the wide exclusion criteria. Type I d′ was
unbiased when using narrow exclusion criteria but became biased for wide exclusion
criteria. The increase in bias for wider exclusion criteria can be explained by the
exclusions being applied asymmetrically to outliers.
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Both meta-d′ measures exhibited greater standard deviation across subjects than d′.
For wide exclusion criteria, d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
showed similar variance, but for narrow exclusion
criteria d˜′
b
had a higher variance. Out of the three measures, only d˜′
b
showed substantially
less variance for the wider exclusion criteria compared with the narrow exclusion criteria.
The decrease in variance for d˜′
b
can be explained by the exclusions successfully removing
extreme values.
Why are bias and variance different for the two different measures d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
? We
suggest that the two measures can both be thought of as averages of two
response-conditional meta-d′ values, (one for positive type I responses and one for
negative type I responses). The averaging is performed differently on each of the two
measures (see section ‘Meta-d′’). In these examples, the effective weighting on d˜′
SSE
is
leading to lower bias and variance than d˜′
b
. However, it is unclear if this generalizes,
particularly as Figure S1 shows an example for which d˜′
SSE
is in theory less stable than d˜′
b
.
An alternative way of dealing with outlying subjects is to add 0.5, i.e. a ‘flattening
constant’, to every data cell for every subject (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). This can be
justified from a Bayesian perspective as the implementation of a prior belief that d′ and
decision and confidence thresholds are near zero, worth one observation for each of the hit
and false alarm rates and corresponding miss and correct rejection rates, i.e. it is a unit
information prior (Kass & Wasserman, 1995), corresponding to the belief that with
approximately 95% probability all of the hit and false alarm rates lie between 0.05 and
0.95.6 Such a prior, though vague, adds some information and can increase the accuracy
of estimates when data are limited (Agresti & Coull, 1998; Greenland, 2006). The effects
of flattening constants on the bias and variance of meta-d′ measurements can be
determined for a given experimental situation using the free code we describe below.
In summary, the above simulations show that bias and variance should be taken into
account when measuring meta-d′ from finite data sets. Narrow exclusion criteria lead to
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less bias but greater variance than wide exclusion criteria. For the examples considered
here, the narrow exclusion criteria appear to perform better, particularly as the wide
criteria can lead to many more subjects being excluded [Figure 8(a)]. However, in another
example scenario that we ran, we simulated a high number (300) of trials per subject, and
found that the bias was roughly zero independent of exclusion criteria, but again that a
much smaller variance could be obtained with wide exclusion criteria. For a given
experimental scenario, we therefore recommend using our simulation code (see below) to
decide on exclusion criteria and gain expectations about bias and variance. Finally we
note that in a paradigm in which subjects give a confidence rating on a multi-point
(i.e. greater than two-point) scale, multiple readings of the meta-d′ measures can be
obtained: as with type I d′ analyses, multiple measurements of each hit and false alarm
rate would be obtained by using multiple thresholds for defining high and low confidence
from the multi-point confidence scale. In that scenario, the simulations described here
could be used to obtain estimates of bias and error separately for each such meta-d′
reading, paving the way for finding the best way of combining the readings into a single
estimate of the true meta-d′ value. We will explore this in future work.
Simulation code
For application beyond the present study, we provide MATLAB simulation code
(see ‘Supplemental material’) which furnishes estimates of the expected bias and variance
of meta-d′ for the number of trials per subject from which the data is drawn, and for the
hit and false alarm rates actually observed. (Since hit and false alarm rates are binomially
distributed under the assumption of independent identical trials, estimates of these from
data are unbiased.) Knowing the expected bias is useful for obtaining more accurate
estimates of meta-d′, while knowing the expected variance is useful as it could be
compared with the observed variance to derive an estimate of the variance of true meta-d′
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values across subjects in an experiment.
Discussion
In this paper we have examined three distinct approaches to measuring
metacognitive sensitivity within the framework of SDT. Corroborating previous analyses
(Galvin et al., 2003; Evans & Azzopardi, 2007), we found that the type II d-prime and
ROC curve approaches both risk confounding metacognition with (types I and II) response
bias, and as a consequence can give misleading results. By contrast, our detailed analyses
of the meta-d′ approach support its use in measuring metacognition independently of
other processes. Our specific contributions include (i) rigorous analytical characterization
of the limits of type II d-prime and ROC curve analysis; (ii) definition of a new ROC
curve analysis based on optimal type II ROC curves, furnishing a useful method for
assessing whether SDT is an appropriate framework for modelling empirical data; (iii)
derivation of (implicit form) analytical expressions for a new version of meta-d′, d˜′
b
; (iv)
rigorous examination of the behaviour of meta-d′ under both standard SDT models and in
empirically plausible scenarios involving signal degradation, signal enhancement, and
trial-by-trial type I criterion jitter; (v) characterization of bias and variance in estimation
of meta-d′ measures in sample, and (vi) provision of easy-to-use MATLAB code enabling
bias and variance estimation in a wide range of experimental and modelling situations.
Type II d-prime and ROC curves
In new systematic analyses of its behaviour on the standard SDT model, we have
shown that type II d-prime (D′) is highly dependent on decision and confidence
thresholds, and in extreme cases can be negative, or even greater than (type I) d′. These
findings corroborate empirical analyses by Evans & Azzopardi (2007). We found that even
for empirically reasonable ranges of decision and confidence thresholds, D′ values can vary
across a range greater than 1
2
d′. Moreover, D′ is typically maximized by being maximally
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unconfident on each trial. The apparently counterintuitive behaviour of D′ in these
examples is a direct consequence of incorrectly assuming Gaussian distributions for the
evidence underlying confidence judgments. Further we found more generally that the
discrepancy between types I and II ROC curves depended quite strongly on the type I
threshold, even for optimal type II ROC curves (constructed for a given type I threshold
by optimizing the type II hit rate for each type II false alarm rate). Somewhat
counterintuitively, the maximum area under the type II ROC curve is attained by using
an extreme type I threshold such that the type I response is the same on almost all trials.
We conclude that metacognition cannot be indexed directly by the area under the type II
ROC curve. A discrepancy between the observed type II ROC curve and the optimal type
II ROC curve doesn’t distinguish imperfect metacognition from a strategy which (as
compared to maximizing type II performance) involves maintaining confidence thresholds
separately for each type I response. (For example, setting a low confidence threshold on
trials in which the type I response is ‘present’, and a higher confidence threshold on trials
in which the type I response is ‘absent’ may result in an overall type II hit rate that is not
optimal given the overall type II false alarm rate.)
Meta-d′
Meta-d′ measures are explicitly designed to be exactly equal to d′ whenever type I
and II responses are made based on a standard SDT model, as in Figure 1. Thus, trivially
on the standard SDT model, meta-d′ is fully independent of (type I or II) response bias.
Furthermore, any observed difference between meta-d′ and d′ has a clear interpretation in
units that correspond to the stimulus absent evidence standard deviation. Despite these
attractive properties, the consistency, stability and independence from response bias of
meta-d′ had not been previously examined beyond the standard SDT model. Here, we
have confirmed that meta-d′ remains consistent, stable, and mostly independent from
27
response bias in alternative SDT models involving (i) a degrading (type II) signal, (ii) an
enhancing (type II) signal, and (iii) (type I) criterion jitter; in all cases subject to decision
and confidence thresholds lying within an empirically reasonable range. These results
strongly support the use of meta-d′ as a sensitive measure of metacognitive performance in
discrimination tasks.
It is important to recognize that the concept of meta-d′ can be operationalized in a
variety of ways. In their introduction of the concept, Lau et al. took a data-driven
approach (Rounis et al., 2010, Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; see section ‘Meta-d′’). Assuming a
common level of metacognition following positive and negative type I responses, a single
estimate of meta-d′ is derived from a system of equations based on all of the observed hit
rates and false alarm rates. This system of equations does not generally have a
simultaneous solution, and so the estimate is obtained by minimizing the sum of the
squares of the errors of the equations. This approach defines the measure d˜′
SSE
. (Lau et
al. have also introduced a second method for fitting the equations, namely via a maximum
likelihood approach, yielding the measure meta-d′-MLE. We have not analyzed
meta-d′-MLE here, but we believe it to behave similarly to the versions of meta-d′ that we
have analyzed.) In this paper we have formulated an alternative measure which does not
assume that the level of metacognition is the same following a positive or negative type I
response. This new measure, d˜′
b
, is built from the weighted average (23) of respective
values computed from positive and negative type I responses. For a given theoretical
scenario, e.g. in our studies of the degrading signal and enhanced signal models, d˜′
b
always
has a well-defined value, that can be computed without any error, as the unique solution
to our system of equations (14, 15, 19, 20, 23). While we have introduced the new d˜′
b
measure because we consider it conceptually more straightforward for theoretical work, in
practice both d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
are equally usable for theoretical and empirical studies. True
theoretical values of hit and false alarm rates can be plugged into the equations for d˜′
SSE
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and the value that minimizes the sum-square-error can be computed. This can then be
taken to be the true value of d˜′
SSE
for the model, even though it has been derived by
considering error terms in a set of equations. We have indeed explored the theoretical
behaviour of both measures, and their behaviour on finite samples of simulated data; we
found d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
to behave similar to each other in the scenarios we have considered.
Still other varieties of meta-d′ can be envisaged. For example, one could also
consider the response-conditional quantities d˜′+ and d˜
′
− as separate measures in their own
right. Interestingly, when applied to a perceptual detection task these measures could
dissect differences in metacognition separately for ‘seen’ and ‘unseen’ trials (c.f. Kanai et
al., 2010). However, initial exploration of these measures indicated that they are less
stable than either d˜′
b
or d˜′
SSE
; further investigation is beyond the present scope. We also
defer for future investigations other varieties of meta-d′ that fix quantities other than the
relative type I threshold (Θ) when comparing type I and type II responses: possibilities
include fixing the type I false alarm rate (i.e., meta-d′ as the d′ that would have led to the
observed type II data at the same type I false alarm rate as that observed).
Our study is also the first to examine the statistical properties of meta-d′ measures
on finite data via a simulation model. By doing so we were able to characterize expected
bias and standard error of meta-d′ for finite subjects and trials-per-subject, as a function
of type I and type II hit and false alarm rates. We illustrated this process in three
simulation scenarios, representing ‘low’, ‘medium’, and ‘high’ metacognition respectively.
The results were complex but can be summarized as showing: (i) variance in meta-d′ is in
general higher than variance in type I d-prime; (ii) bias could be positive or negative
depending on the exclusion criteria employed, with narrow exclusion criteria (i.e.,
excluding fewer subjects) showing less bias but more variance as compared to wide
exclusion criteria. Since bias and variance depend on many factors it is sensible to
estimate these quantities for any given experiment, and use the estimates to tailor
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analyses and inferences. Facilitating this, along with this paper we provide MATLAB
simulation code which furnishes estimates of bias and variance in meta-d′ when given as
inputs: (i) number of trials per subject, and (ii) observed hit and false alarm rates. This
code will facilitate interpretation of meta-d′ in discrimination experiments and can also be
used to inform experiment design to optimize (i.e., minimize or trade-off) expected bias
and variance in meta-d′.
Summary and conclusions
Measuring metacognitive (type II) performance independently from discrimination
(type I) performance is a key challenge in any situation where metacognitive accuracy is
important to assess in cognitive, developmental, social, educational, comparative, or
abnormal psychology (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005, Beran, Brandl, Perner & Proust,
2012, Efklides & Misailidi 2010). For example, in consciousness research, metacognition is
often interpreted as reflecting conscious processing (Kolb & Braun, 1995; Lau &
Passingham, 2006; Szczepanowski & Pessoa, 2007; Rounis et al., 2010; Dienes & Perner,
1999; Dienes & Scott, 2005; Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey, 2007). Commonly, at-chance
type II performance accompanying above-chance type I performance is taken to reflect
implicit processing (Weiskrantz, 1997). Conversely, above-chance type II performance
(accompanying above-chance type I performance) is taken to reflect conscious processing.
Going further, it is tempting to interpret any discrepancy between performance at the two
levels (when both are above chance) as the degree to which explicit (metacognitive)
awareness falls short of implicit (unconscious) performance (Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans,
Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008). Validating and quantifying claims like these requires type II
measures that are sensitive to type II performance but independent of response biases at
both type I and type II levels, and which are commensurable with type I measures. In this
paper we have extensively reviewed and analysed several current approaches to this
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challenge, all grounded in SDT. Our results indicate that the relatively new measure,
meta-d′, is both theoretically the most principled and empirically the most useful measure
among those considered. Complementing this conclusion we provide new (implicit)
analytic formulae for calculating a new version of meta-d′ (d˜′
b
), and simulation code which
can be used to estimate sample bias and variance in meta-d′. Taken together our results
provide important new constraints and new heuristics governing the design and
interpretation of experiments involving measurements of metacognitive performance.
Some theories of consciousness emphasize a central role for metacognition. Notably,
so-called higher-order-thought (HOT) theories (Rosenthal, 2005; Carruthers, 1996;
Gennaro, 2004) propose that conscious content is specified by the existence of higher-order
(i.e., metacognitive) representations of the corresponding first-order content. On these
theories, metacognition is constitutively determinate of consciousness and measures of
metacognition therefore represent clear operationalizations of the corresponding theories.
For example, an inability to discriminate states of completely guessing from states of
having some knowledge is good evidence that one is not aware of one’s knowledge, and
hence, on higher order theories, that the knowledge is unconscious. On these theories, the
type II criterion should be distinguishing complete guessing from any amount of
confidence in order for a zero meta-d′ to show unconscious knowledge; conversely, having a
zero meta-d′ when confidence is always high is not diagnostic of unconscious knowledge
(Dienes, 2004). However, one need not buy into HOT-type theories in order to benefit
from reliable measures of metacognition for advancing our understanding of consciousness.
All theories of consciousness rely either explicitly or implicitly on subjective reports as
data, and delineating the boundaries between what happens implicitly and what is
(reportably) conscious provides important constraints on any theory (Seth et al., 2008).
One useful avenue to integrating consciousness theories with SDT will be to identify the
extent to which separable brain networks subserve type I and type II discriminations
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(Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010; Fleming & Dolan, 2012).
An important future challenge lies in integrating SDT with the increasingly
influential framework of ‘predictive coding’ or the so-called ‘Bayesian Brain’ hypothesis
(Rao & Ballard, 1999; Bubic, Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; Friston, 2010; Clark, in press).
According to this framework, perceptual content is determined by top-down predictive
signals arising from multi-level generative models of the external causes of sensory signals,
which are continually modified by bottom-up prediction error signals communicating
mismatches between predicted and actual signals across hierarchical levels. This view
stands in contrast to classical ‘evidence accumulation’ frameworks, exemplified by SDT,
which treat bottom-up signals as carrying content. Although in some situations predictive
coding and evidence accumulation are mathematically equivalent (Spratling, 2008), when
considered from the perspective of SDT there remain many possible ways in which
top-down expectations may shape evidence distributions at type I and type II levels
(Turner, van Zandt, & Brown, 2011; Wyart, Nobre, & Summerfield, 2012). We hope the
rigorous treatment of current SDT provided here will provide a firm platform from which
these more speculative issues can be usefully explored.
Supplemental material
The file ‘simmetadb.m’ is a MATLAB m-file for estimating the bias and variance of
d′ and meta-d′ measurements, as described in the section ‘Bias and variance of meta-d′
measures in sample’. The file takes as inputs mean type I and II hit and false alarm rates,
the ratio of standard deviations σ, number of trials (s) per subject and number of subjects
(n). Users also have the choice of whether to use ‘narrow’ or ‘wide’ criteria for subject
exclusion, and whether to use a flattening constant (see section ‘Bias and variance of
meta-d′ measures in sample’). The code simulates subjects performing s trials, computing
empirical d′ and d˜′
b
for each subject, repeating until n non-excluded subjects have been
32
simulated. The code outputs true values of d′ and d˜′
b
, mean empirical d′ and d˜′
b
, empirical
standard deviation of d′ and d˜′
b
, and the proportion of excluded subjects. The file
‘metadprimepm.m’ computes the standard estimate of d˜′
b
from single subject data, taking
as inputs the type I and II hit and false alarm rates and the assumed value of σ. The files
‘eqformetadplus.m’ and ‘eqformetadminus.m’ are auxiliary files.
The file ‘furtherdetailsandresults.pdf’ contains further material on meta-d′ on
alternative SDT models, namely degrading signal, enhancing signal and criterion jitter
models.
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Appendix A
Mathematical conventions
Here we justify our conventions and describe an alternative definition of d′. Suppose
the true evidence for stimulus absent, Y0, has a N (µ0, σ
2
0) distribution, and the true
evidence for stimulus present, Y1, has a N (µ1, σ
2
1) distribution, i.e., the most general
Gaussian case. Then our convention is to define d′ as
d′ =
µ1 − µ0
σ0
, (32)
the difference between the means, in units of the noise distribution standard deviation. A
simple linear transformation defines
X0 =:
Y0 − µ0
σ0
, X1 =:
Y1 − µ0
σ0
. (33)
Then X0 ∼ N (0, 1) and X1 ∼ N (d
′, σ2), where σ = σ1/σ0, recovering the conventions
described in the main section.
Another definition of d′ that has appeared in the literature (Macmillan & Creelman,
2005) is
d′ =:
µ1 − µ0√
1
2
(
σ20 + σ
2
1
) . (34)
In this case, the transformation (33) leads to X0 ∼ N (0, 1) and X1 ∼ N (µ, σ
2), where
µ =
µ1 − µ0
σ0
, σ =
σ1
σ0
, (35)
and the formula for d′ becomes
d′ =
µ√
1
2
(1 + σ2)
. (36)
This formula, and the variables X0 and X1, with the parameters µ, σ define the most
convenient formulation of the general SDT model for this alternative definition of d′.
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The results presented in this paper are very similar for either of these two possible
definitions of d′, and in particular for the case σ = 1 the two definitions are exactly
equivalent.
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Appendix B
Computation of type II hit rate and false alarm rate
Here we explain how to derive the formulae (5) and (6) for the type II hit rate and
false alarm rate on the standard SDT model. For the hit rate we have
H ≡ P (C = 1|T = 1) = P (C = 1|R = 0, S = 0) · P (R = 0, S = 0|T = 1)
+P (C = 1|R = 1, S = 1) · P (R = 1, S = 1|T = 1) . (37)
The four quantities on the RHS of this expression can be written down as follows:
P (R = 0, S = 0|T = 1) =
P (R = 0, S = 0)
P (R = 0, S = 0) + P (R = 1, S = 1)
(38)
=
Φ0(θ)
Φ0(θ) + 1− Φd′,σ(θ)
, (39)
P (C = 1|R = 0, S = 0) =
Φ0(τ−)
Φ0(θ)
, (40)
P (R = 1, S = 1|T = 1) =
1− Φd′,σ(θ)
Φ0(θ) + 1− Φd′,σ(θ)
, (41)
P (C = 1|R = 1, S = 1) =
1− Φd′,σ(τ+)
1− Φd′,σ(θ)
. (42)
The expression (5) follows by substitution of these four expressions into (37). The formula
(6) is derived following the same method.
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Appendix C
Computation of Hmax on the standard SDT model
To compute Hmax, we have to maximize H with respect to τ+ and τ−, given the
data F , f and h. It is convenient to rewrite the formulae (5) and (6) for H and F as
H =
1 + Φ0(τ−)− Φd′,σ(τ+)
1 + h− f
, (43)
F =
1− Φ0(τ+) + Φd′,σ(τ−)
1− h+ f
, (44)
where here we have used (2) and (3). Then maximizing H, whilst keeping F fixed means
extremizing the following quantity, where λ is a Lagrange multiplier:
Y =:
1 + Φ0(τ−)− Φd′,σ(τ+)
1 + h− f
+ λ
[
1− Φ0(τ+) + Φd′,σ(τ−)
1− h+ f
− F
]
. (45)
Setting partial derivatives of Y with respect to τ+ and τ− to zero yields the following
equation:
φ0(τ+)φ0(τ−) = φd′,σ(τ+)φd′,σ(τ−) . (46)
For the usual case of σ = 1 this leads to
τ+ = −τ− + d
′ , (47)
F =
1
1− h+ f
[
1−Φ0
(
−τ− + d
′
)
+Φd′,σ(τ−)
]
, (48)
Hmax =
1
1 + h− f
[
1 + Φ0(τ−)− Φd′,σ
(
−τ− + d
′
)]
. (49)
We find τ− by solving (48) numerically and then, using the obtained value, obtaining
Hmax from (49). When this yields results with decision and confidence thresholds not in
the correct order τ− < θ < τ+, then the optimum is at the boundary, i.e., if τ+ < θ then
we reset τ+ = θ and compute τ− and H directly from (43) and (44) to obtain
τ− = Φ
−1
d′,σ
[(1− h+ f)F − f ] , (50)
Hmax =
h+Φ0(τ−)
1 + h− f
. (51)
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Similarly for the case in which τ− comes out as greater than θ, we reset τ− = θ and obtain
τ+ = Φ
−1
0 [2− h− (1− h+ f)F ] , (52)
Hmax =
2− f − Φd′,σ(τ+)
1 + h− f
. (53)
For the general case of σ 6= 1 equation (46) is quadratic in τ+ and τ−, and often has no
real solution. This leads to a more complicated analysis, with optimum values of τ+ or τ−
often occurring at the boundary.
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Appendix D
Optimal type II thresholds and variation of Hmax with type I
response bias
Here, we illustrate the dependence of optimal type II thresholds and Hmax on type I
response bias. Figure 9 shows optimal values of τ± and Hmax for the case d
′ = 1, σ = 1
and for the two values F = 0.5 and F = 0.1. Of note is that for values of θ in between the
peaks of the ‘present’ and ‘absent’ evidence distributions, the optimal type II thresholds
are symmetric about the point of intersection of the two distributions, and not symmetric
about θ. Also worth noting is that when Hmax is compared for different values of θ, Hmax
is minimized when θ is at its optimum position at the midpoint of the ‘present’ and
‘absent’ distributions, and Hmax is maximized for values of θ that correspond to very
strong type I response bias.
FIGURE 9 HERE
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Footnotes
1An alternative definition is the difference between the means divided by the mean of
the standard deviations of the ‘absent’ and ‘present’ evidence distributions.
2An alternative measure utilizes units of the mean standard deviation of the two
distributions, and is in fact a more principled measure for the case of distinguishing
between two stimuli as opposed to stimulus present versus stimulus absent. We discuss
these issues in Appendix A.
3This assumption may be safer for an A vs B discrimination than for a present vs
absent discrimination; see Appendix A.
4Note that confidence ratings were first introduced in SDT to obtain a better
characterization of the type I model, with a distinct purpose to the current study on
metacognition and the type II model.
5Galvin et al. (2003) showed that for F = f , and the likelihood ratio of stimuli
monotonically increasing along the decision axis, the type I ROC curve is an upper bound
for the type II ROC curve; the monotonically increasing likelihood ratio condition is
satisfied for our ideal SDT model with σ = 1.
6This also corresponds to the prior belief with 95% confidence that d′ and β lie
roughly between ±3. There is no magic for using 0.5 as the number added to each cell; if
for example one was 95% sure that d′ lay between ±2, one could add 1 to each cell; or if
95% sure that d′ lay between ±1.5, one could add 2.
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Table 1
Table of mathematical notation and terminology
Symbol Description / Terminology
S stimulus
R (type I) response
T correctness of response
C confidence judgement (i.e. type II response)
h, f respectively type I hit and false alarm rate
H, F respectively type II hit and false alarm rate
H+, F+ respectively type II hit and false alarm rates restricted to positive type I
responses
H−, F− respectively type II hit and false alarm rates restricted to negative type I
responses
X the evidence on which the response and confidence judgment are made
θ decision (type I) threshold
τ+ upper confidence (type II) threshold
τ− lower confidence (type II) threshold
σ ratio of standard deviations of the evidence in the case S = 1 to the
case S = 0
Φ0, φ0 respectively the cumulative distribution function and probability density
functions of the standard Gaussian distribution of mean 0 and variance 1
Φd,σ, φd,σ respectively the cumulative distribution function and probability density
functions of the Gaussian distribution of mean d and variance σ
d′ type I d-prime
D′ type II d-prime
Θ relative type I threshold
d˜′
b
meta-d′-balance
d˜′
SSE
meta-d′-SSE
tildes meta-quantities
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Table 2
Table of type I and II hit and false alarm rates for the example simulations at each level of
metacognition
Level of metacognition h f H+ H− F+ F−
Low 0.7 0.35 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
Medium 0.7 0.35 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4
High 0.7 0.35 0.7 0.7 0.35 0.35
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Figure 1. The ideal SDT model. The blue curve shows the distribution of the evidence X
when the stimulus is absent (S = 0) and the red curve shows the distribution when the
stimulus is present (S = 1). The stimulus is detected as present (R = 1) if X is greater
than the type I threshold θ. Confidence is high (C = 1) if X is greater than the upper type
II threshold τ+ or less than the lower type II threshold τ−. We define d
′ as the distance
between means in units of the ‘stimulus absent’ distribution standard deviation (always 1 in
our conventions). In this schematic d′ = 1, the standard deviation of the ‘stimulus present’
distribution σ = 1, and the types I and II thresholds are set arbitrarily.
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Figure 2. (a) The cumulative distribution function Φ0 of the standard Gaussian distribution
with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. (b) The inverse, Φ−10 , used in the formula (1) for
d′. For small or large p, a small change in p leads to a large change in Φ−10 .
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
F, f
H,
 h
1 2 3 4-0.5
0
0.5
1
τ +
D'
, 
m
et
a-
d'
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
F, f
H,
 h
-1 0 1 2-0.5
0
0.5
1
τ
-
D'
, 
m
et
a-
d'
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
F, f
H,
 h
0 2 4 6-0.5
0
0.5
1
Di"erence between θ and τ
+
 / τ
-
D'
, 
m
et
a-
d'
-5 0 50
0.5
X
Pr
ob
.
 
De
n
sit
y
   θ=0.5, symmetric type II thresholds
-5 0 50
0.5
X
Pr
ob
.
 
De
n
sit
y
θ=1, τ
-
=1
-5 0 50
0.5
X
Pr
ob
.
 
De
n
sit
y
θ=2, τ
+
=2(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f )
(g) (h) (i)
Figure 3. Type II d-prime (D′) and meta-d′ under varying decision and confidence thresholds
for the standard SDT model with d′ = 1 and σ = 1. Top row (a-c): Evidence distributions
(red, present; blue, absent) and decision and confidence thresholds for (a) θ = 0.5, τ+ and
τ− symmetric about θ; (b) θ = 1, τ− = 1, τ+ variable; (c) θ = 2, τ+ = 2, τ− variable.
Thick black arrows show the threshold being varied in each case. Middle row (d-f): D′
(red) and meta-d′ (= d˜′
b
= d˜′
SSE
) (blue) against varying type II thresholds, corresponding
to the scenarios in (a-c) respectively. Dotted black lines mark where zero is on the vertical
axis. Bottom row (g-i): Type II ROC curves (red) for H against F for the points plotted
in (d-f) respectively. The blue cross in each panel shows the corresponding single type I
ROC point, and the blue dashed line the full type I ROC curve. The dotted black line
in (h) is the line H = F . By design, meta-d′ is equal to d′, for all choices of decision
and confidence thresholds, and whichever variant of the measure is used. By contrast,
D′ is highly dependent on decision and confidence thresholds, and in extreme cases can
be negative, or even greater than d′. Thus meta-d′ but not D′ is a stable measure of
metacognition in these scenarios.
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Figure 4. Optimal type II ROC curves, D′ and meta-d′ for two different choices of type
I threshold. Top row (a,b): evidence distributions (red, present; blue, absent) and type
I thresholds (dashed line, θ) for: (a) d′ = 1, σ = 1, θ = 0.5; (b) d′ = 1, σ = 1, θ = 3.
Middle row (c,d): optimal ROC curves (red, Hmax against F ) corresponding respectively to
(a) and (b). In these panels the blue cross indicates the corresponding single type I ROC
point (f, h), and the blue dashed line shows the full type I ROC curve obtained by varying
θ. Note that in (d) the type I and II ROC curves almost exactly coincide. Bottom row
(e,f): D′ (red) and meta-d′ (= d˜′
b
= d˜′
SSE
) (blue) against F for the respective ROC curves
in the row above (c,d). In each of the two cases, the optimal type II ROC curve compares
differently with the corresponding type I ROC curve (c,d), and D′ is highly variable (e,f).
Only meta-d′ remains constant, and therefore accurately reflects the optimal metacognition
in both cases.
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Figure 5. Behaviour of meta-d′ under systematic variation of type II false alarm and hit
rates. (a) d˜′
b
(blue) and d˜′
SSE
(green) against F+ with h = 0.8, f = 0.4, σ = 1, H+ and
H− fixed at 0.2, and F+ and F− fixed to be equal. (b) d˜
′
b
(blue) and d˜′
SSE
(green) against
H+ with h = 0.6, f = 0.2, σ = 1, F+ and F− fixed at 0.3, and H+ and H− fixed to be
equal. Dashed lines show d′. Dotted lines indicate the boundaries of the stable regions as
defined by the criterion (29) for meta-d′ measures to be stable. This excludes the region to
the left in (a) and the region to the right in (b). For the stable regions, both d˜′
b
and d˜′
SSE
give similar values for meta-d′.
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Figure 6. Behaviour of meta-d′ on a degrading signal model. Top row: Evidence
distributions for a degrading signal model (parameter values d′ = 1, σ = 1, a0 = a1 =
s0 = s1 = 1/2; see Supplemental Material for details). (a) Evidence distributions for the
type I response. (b) Average evidence distributions for the type II response. Bottom row:
Meta-d′ for the distributions in (a,b) plotted against (c) type I threshold θ, (d) upper
type II threshold τ+ and (e) lower type II threshold τ−, holding the other two thresholds
constant in each case. Blue curves show d˜′
b
and green curves show d˜′
SSE
. Dashed lines
show the constant value of d′ = 1. In each panel, the threshold is varied across the full
range satisfying the inclusion criterion (29). Meta-d′ values are approximately independent
of decision and confidence thresholds (though less so for θ; see text) and are less than d′,
reflecting imperfect metacognition due to the degrading signal.
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Figure 7. Behaviour of meta-d′ on an enhancing signal model. Top row: Evidence
distributions for an enhancing signal model with (parameter values d′ = 1, σ = 1,
b0 = b1 = 1/4; see Supplemental Material for details). (a) Evidence distributions for
the type I response. (b) Average evidence distributions for the type II response. Bottom
row: Meta-d′ for the distributions in (a,b) plotted against (c) type I threshold θ, (d) upper
type II threshold τ+ and (e) lower type II threshold τ−, holding the other two thresholds
constant in each case. Blue curves show d˜′
b
and green curves show d˜′
SSE
. Dashed lines
show the constant value of d′ = 1. In each panel, the threshold is varied across the full
range satisfying the inclusion criterion (29). Meta-d′ values are approximately independent
of decision and confidence thresholds, and are greater than d′, reflecting the enhanced
evidence available for the type II metacognitive task.
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Figure 8. Bias and variance of d′ and meta-d′ in simulations of 10,000 (non-excluded)
subjects, each performing 50 trials. (a) Probability of a subject being excluded in the low,
medium and high metacognition examples for narrow (light grey) and wide (dark grey)
exclusion criteria. (b) Bias and (c) standard deviation of d′, d˜′
b
(balance) and d˜′
SSE
(SSE)
for low, medium and high metacognition examples with narrow (light grey) and wide (dark
grey) exclusion criteria. The hit and false alarm rates used in each of the simulations are
given in Table 2. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Wide exclusion criteria lead
to more bias but less variance in empirical meta-d′.
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Figure 9. (a) Optimal τ+ and τ− and (b) Hmax for d
′ = 1 and F = 0.5. (c) Optimal τ+ and
τ− and (d) Hmax for d
′ = 1 and F = 0.1. σ = 1 in both cases. Dotted vertical lines show
where the peaks of the S = 0 and S = 1 distributions lie. The dotted diagonal lines in (a)
and (c) show τ = θ. Hmax shows substantial variability under changes in type I response
bias and reaches a peak for type I threshold values that correspond to very strong type I
response bias.
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Mathematical description of degrading signal model
The general mathematical description of the type II evidence on this model is as follows. The
degraded type II evidence when the stimulus is absent is
X
(II)
0 ∼ N (a0x0, s
2
0) , (1)
where x0 is the outcome of the type I evidence, and 0 < a0 < 1 and s0 are free parameters. Similarly,
when the stimulus is present the degraded type II evidence is
X
(II)
1 ∼ N (a1x1, s
2
1) . (2)
We denote the type I threshold by θ and the type II thresholds by τ± as above, but note that due
to the degradation of the signal, the constraint τ− < θ < τ+ is not needed. The type II hit rate for
positive responses is then given by
H+ = P (X
(II)
1 > τ+|X1 > θ) (3)
=
1
h
∫
∞
θ
P (X
(II)
1 > τ+|X1 = x) · PX1(x)dx (4)
= 1−
1
h
∫
∞
θ
φd′,σ(x)Φa1x,s1(τ+)dx . (5)
Similarly,
F+ = 1−
1
f
∫
∞
θ
φ0(x)Φa0x,s0(τ+)dx , (6)
H− =
1
1− f
∫ θ
−∞
φ0(x)Φa0x,s0(τ−)dx , (7)
F− =
1
1− h
∫ θ
−∞
φd′,σ(x)Φa1x,s1(τ−)dx . (8)
1
Mathematical description of enhancing signal model
The general mathematical description of the type II evidence on this model is as follows. When the
stimulus is absent, the type II evidence is given by
X
(II)
0 ∼ N (x0, b
2
0) , (9)
where x0 is the outcome of the type I evidence, and b0 is a free parameter. Thus, some additional
variance is added, reflecting an increase in noise, but the evidence remains the same on average.
When the stimulus is present, the enhanced type II evidence is given by
X
(II)
1 ∼ N (x1 + b1d
′, b21σ
2) , (10)
where x1 is the outcome of the type I evidence, and b1 is a free parameter. The type II hit rates and
false alarm rates are computed similarly to on the degrading signal model, such that
H+ = 1−
1
h
∫
∞
θ
φd′,σ(x)Φx+b1d′,b1σ(τ+)dx , (11)
F+ = 1−
1
f
∫
∞
θ
φ0(x)Φx,b0(τ+)dx , (12)
H− =
1
1− f
∫ θ
−∞
φ0(x)Φx,b0(τ−)dx , (13)
F− =
1
1− h
∫ θ
−∞
φd′,σ(x)Φx+b1d′,b1σ(τ−)dx . (14)
Examples with unequal variances
Here we illustrate the behaviour of meta-d′ measures on degrading and enhancing signal models
with type I evidence distributions of unequal variance (σ = 2). Figure S1 shows behaviour on
the degrading signal model and Figure S2 illustrates the enhancing signal model. These figures
correspond to Figures 6 and 7 for the equal variance case.
Model with type I criterion jitter
SDT models often assume that the decision threshold remains stable over time; however it has been
argued that trial-to-trial jitter in the decision threshold may exist (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Mueller
& Weidemann, 2008; Benjamin, Diaz, & Wee, 2009). Here we examine a model with type I criterion
jitter to test whether this affects the independence of meta-d′ from types I and II response bias.
On this model, the type I and type II evidence are generated following the standard SDT model.
However, while the type II thresholds τ± remain constant across trials, the type I threshold is jittered
according to an independent Gaussian random variable on each trial.
The mathematical description of this model is as follows. We denote the jittered type I threshold
by Θ ∼ N (θ, η2). We denote the distance between ‘present’ and ‘absent’ distributions by d, dropping
the prime since the actual d′ [as measured by performance according to (1)] is affected by the jitter
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Figure S1. Meta-d′ on a degrading signal model with unequal variances (a0 = a1 = s0 = s1 = 1/2,
d′ = 2, σ = 2). Top row: evidence distributions for (a) the type I response and (b) the type II
response; stimulus absent in blue, stimulus present in red. Bottom row: behaviour of meta-d′ for
varying (c) θ, (d) τ+, and (e) τ−. Blue curves show d˜
′
b and green curves show d˜
′
SSE. Dashed lines
show the constant value of d′ = 2. In each panel, the threshold being varied is taken across the full
range that satisfies the inclusion criterion (29).
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Figure S2. Meta-d′ on an enhancing signal model with unequal variances (b0 = b1 = 1/4, d
′ = 2,
σ = 2). Top row: evidence distributions for (a) the type I response and (b) the type II response;
stimulus absent in blue, stimulus present in red. Bottom row: behaviour of meta-d′ for varying (c) θ,
(d) τ+, and (e) τ−. Blue curves show d˜
′
b and green curves show d˜
′
SSE. Dashed lines show the constant
value of d′ = 2. In each panel, the threshold being varied is taken across the full range that satisfies
the inclusion criterion (29).
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and is less than d. It can be shown that the type I hit rate and false alarm rate are given by
h = 1− Φ0
(
−
d− θ√
σ2 + η2
)
, (15)
f = 1− Φ0
(
θ√
1 + η2
)
, (16)
and hence
d′ = σ
d− θ√
σ2 + η2
+
θ√
1 + η2
. (17)
The type II quantities are derived as follows:
H+ = = P (X1 > τ+|X1 > Θ) (18)
=
∫
∞
−∞
dθ′P (X1 > τ+|X1 > θ)PΘ(θ
′) (19)
=
∫ τ+
−∞
dθ′Φθ,η(θ
′)
1−Φd,σ(τ+)
1− Φd,σ(θ′)
+
∫
∞
τ+
dθ′Φθ,η(θ
′) , (20)
and similarly
F+ =
∫ τ+
−∞
dθ′Φθ,η(θ
′)
1− Φ0(τ+)
1− Φ0(θ′)
+
∫
∞
τ+
dθ′Φθ,η(θ
′) , (21)
H− =
∫
∞
τ−
dθ′Φθ,η(θ
′)
Φ0(τ−)
Φ0(θ′)
+
∫ τ−
−∞
dθ′Φθ,η(θ
′) , (22)
F− =
∫
∞
τ−
dθ′Φθ,η(θ
′)
Φd,σ(τ−)
Φd,σ(θ′)
+
∫ τ−
−∞
dθ′Φθ,η(θ
′) . (23)
Figures S3 and S4 show the behaviour of d′, d˜′b and d˜
′
SSE on example criterion jitter models with
respectively equal and unequal variances. In both examples d′ is approximately independent of
decision and confidence thresholds, and only slightly less than the distance d between the two evidence
distributions. The meta-d′ measures are approximately equal to d′ for all decision and confidence
threshold values, reflecting well the fact that there is no enhancement or degradation of the evidence
in between the type I and II responses.
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Figure S3. Meta-d′ on a model with type I criterion jitter and equal variances (d = 1, σ = 1,
η = 0.25). (a) Evidence distributions for the type I and II responses; stimulus absent in blue, and
stimulus present in red. Bottom row: meta-d′ for varying (b) mean decision threshold θ, (c) upper
confidence threshold τ+, and (d) lower confidence threshold τ−. Blue curves show d˜
′
b, green curves
show d˜′SSE. The black line in (b) shows d
′, which varies in this case due to the jitter. In (c) and
(d) d′ = d˜′SSE. In (b-d) the threshold is varied across the full range satisfying the inclusion criterion
(29). While the jitter causes d′ to be slightly reduced as compared to the distance between the two
evidence distributions, meta-d′ remains approximately equal to d′.
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Figure S4. Meta-d′ on a model with type I criterion jitter and unequal variances (d = 2, σ = 2,
η = 0.25). (a) Evidence distributions for the type I and II responses, stimulus absent in blue and
stimulus present in red. Bottom row: behaviour of meta-d′ for varying (b) θ, (c) τ+, and (d) τ−.
Blue curves show d˜′b, green curves show d˜
′
SSE, and black curves show d
′, which varies in this case due
to the jitter. In each panel, the threshold being varied is taken across the full range that satisfies the
inclusion criteria.
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